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This paper argues that the foreign direct investment (FDI) data commonly used to test political science theories about
FDI often diverge from the theorized about phenomena in ways that can introduce bias and complicate hypothesis test-
ing. I describe some of the key conceptual issues surrounding the quantification of FDI, how commonly used data deals
with these issues, and the extent to which those coding rules allow or prevent these data from speaking to political sci-
ence theories. I show that the empirical relationship between democracy, political risk, and multinational corporations
behavior is significantly impacted by “getting the measure right.” I conclude by arguing that political science theories
about FDI speak to such a wide variety of empirically and conceptually distinct phenomena that conflating them as “FDI”
does a disservice to the complexity of the topic.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) and foreign direct
investment (FDI) feature prominently in the political sci-
ence literature. Recent work examines FDI as a means of
diffusing norms and practices (Prakash and Potoski
2007), as a determinant of wages and wage inequality
(Jensen and Rosas 2007), as a catalyst for improving
human rights practices (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash
2009), as a phenomenon about which preferences cleave
along partisan and economic lines (Pinto and Pinto
2008; Pandya 2010), as a threat to domestic autonomy
(Cerny 2003), as a means of binding states together in a
“capitalist peace” (Gartzke 2007), and as a vehicle for
understanding the distribution of political risk (Jensen
2003, 2008; Li and Resnick 2003; B€uthe and Milner 2008;
Kerner 2009; Li 2009). The theories and empirical find-
ings from this literature profoundly shape the way that
we understand the relationship between politics and FDI
and politics and globalization more generally.
But how should we conceptualize FDI? Most political
science theories concern various aspects of FDI as a com-
mercial phenomenon relating to the operations and
assets of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled firms.
Scholars believe that foreign ownership of domestic assets
and foreign control over domestic production transmit
norms, affect security interests, provoke popular reac-
tions, invite political risk, respond to and influence local
labor law, and so on. However, FDI can also be thought
of as a financial phenomenon relating to the cross-border
movements of capital between parent MNCs and their
foreign affiliates. This conceptualization raises specific
kinds of political science questions, including FDI’s rela-
tionship to the balance of payments and exchange rates
or factor prices. These questions have occupied a mar-
ginal place in political science literature. Although MNCs’
ownership of domestic assets and control over domestic
production are related to cross-border capital flows, the
two are conceptually and empirically distinct; political
science theory relates to them in different ways. Despite
the overwhelming extent to which our theories under-
stand FDI as a commercial phenomenon, our empirical
tests rely heavily on a measure of border-crossing finan-
cial flows—FDI flows.
I argue that the flow data commonly used to test theo-
ries relating to FDI make a poor empirical proxy for the
aspects of FDI that political scientists typically theorize
about.1 I build upon well-known deficiencies of FDI flow
data as a proxy for FDI in many economics applications
(Lipsey 2003, 2007; Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, and
Smeets 2010) and place those critiques in a political sci-
ence context.2 Briefly, FDI flows describe a macroeco-
nomic phenomenon that differs from what most political
science theories pertain to and these differences vary
across political contexts in ways that are likely to cause
bias. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the issues at stake
are not at all trivial; getting the measures “right”—or clo-
ser to right—carries with it significant implications for
the conclusions that we draw about MNCs and their rela-
tionship to politics.
FDI flow data measure the net value of border-crossing
capital movements between MNCs and their foreign affili-
ates. In essence, they measure the impact that MNCs have
on the host country’s capital account. To illustrate the
problem of conflating financial flows with commercial
operations, take the ambiguous meaning of 0, or near 0,
FDI flows. $0 of FDI flows could mean that there are no
foreign affiliates in a country or that the foreign affiliates
in that country repatriated as much capital over the
course of a year to their parent MNCs as they received
from their parent MNCs and from reinvested earnings.
The balance of payments is unaffected in either scenario.
For example, in 2010, Moldova received $1 million
US FDI inflows from the United States. In this case, the
low FDI flow figure corresponds to low FDI activity: In
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2010, majority-owned foreign affiliates of US MNCs oper-
ating in Moldova controlled $5 million in assets, $2 mil-
lion in fixed capital and employed about 100 people.3
Poland recorded roughly $0 dollars of US FDI inflows in
2005,4 but the low FDI flow figures from Poland and Mol-
dova describe very different phenomena. Between year-
end 2004 and year-end 2005, the 193 Majority-Owned
Nonbank Foreign Affiliates of US MNCs operating in
Poland employed 13,000 more people, increased their
total compensation of employees by $241 million, con-
trolled over $1 billion more in total assets, produced
$679 million more in value added, and increased sales by
over $3 billion.5 Poland recorded 0 FDI inflows that year
because equity outflows ($30 million), reinvested earn-
ings ($194 million), and intercompany debt flows
($163 million) netted out to nearly exactly 0.6 The
expanding operations of American-owned foreign affili-
ates in Poland during this time is relevant to many of the
causal mechanisms embedded in political science theo-
ries. But because they had a neutral effect on Poland’s
capital account, FDI flow data fail to capture them.
I provide a specific demonstration of the consequences
of using FDI flows as a proxy for the commercial phe-
nomena that political scientists theorize about by revisit-
ing the empirical relationship between democracy and
FDI. Scholars typically use this relationship to explore
whether democracies pose more or less political risk than
non-democracies (ex. Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003;
Choi 2009; Li 2009). I estimate democracy’s effect on the
foreign investments of US-based MNCs using flow data,
stock data, and a measure of fixed capital expenditures. I
argue that the last better matches relevant theory than
the alternatives. The evidence suggests that the empirical
relationship between democracy and the overseas opera-
tions of MNCs is both much larger and also more statisti-
cally robust when we conceptualize and measure those
activities as fixed capital expenditures.
This paper contributes not only to the empirical litera-
ture on FDI in political science, it also matters for the
growing literature on construct validity in international
political economy. For example, Quinn, Schindler, and
Toyoda (2011) and Karcher and Steinberg (2012) illus-
trate both the diversity of plausible measures and the pit-
falls of mismatching data to theory with respect to capital
controls and financial integration. This paper makes a
similar intervention with respect to FDI.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion “Defining FDI” discusses different ways to conceptu-
alize FDI with a particular focus on political science
applications. Section “Stock and Flow Data” discusses
commonly used data—FDI flow and stock data—and the
extent to which they correspond with conceptualizations
of FDI common in political science theory. Section
“Empirical Example: Does Democracy Attract FDI?” uses
the insights in Sections “Defining FDI” and “Stock and
Flow Data” to revisit the empirical relationship between
democracy and FDI. Section “Political Scientists (Usually)
Don’t Care About FDI” concludes by noting that FDI-
related theories in political science refer to a diverse set
of phenomena associated with MNCs’ activities abroad,
and often not to FDI per se. As such, the literature on
FDI in political science would be better termed a litera-
ture on the study of MNCs.
Defining FDI
Oatley’s (2012: 376) International Political Economy defines
FDI as “A form of cross-border investment in which a resi-
dent or corporation based in one country owns a produc-
tive asset located in a second country. Such investments
are made by multinational corporations. FDI can involve
the construction of a new, or the purchase of an existing,
plant or factory.” Sobel’s (2006: 460) Political Economy of
Global Affairs defines FDI as “Investment in control of pro-
ductive facilities overseas—usually defined by an invest-
ment that amounts to control of 10% or more of a
company’s equity.”
These definitions contain subtle but consequential dif-
ferences. Oatley’s implies that a foreign source of capital
constitutes a necessary condition of FDI (cross-border
investment), while Sobel’s definition more clearly allows
locally raised capital to count as FDI as long as a foreign-
based MNC controls that capital (control of productive
facilities overseas). Despite the slight rhetorical difference
between these definitions, the empirical difference
amounts globally to trillions of dollars of non-randomly
allocated capital. Both definitions privilege “productive”
assets and activities, which would require any measure to
include a working definition of the word “productive,” as
well as empirical knowledge of how the foreign affiliate
employs capital.
Given this, we can be sure about one thing: FDI
involves two adjectives—“foreign” and “direct”—and one
noun—“investment.”
What Does It Mean To Be Foreign?
There are two ways to understand the significance of the
word “foreign” in FDI. The first holds that, to count as
FDI, the capital itself needs to come from a foreign MNC
and cross a border on its way to the foreign affiliate. A
second understanding of the word “foreign” requires that
the capital must be under the control of a foreign direct
investor. We might call the latter attribute “commercial
foreignness” and the former “financial foreignness.” The
empirical gap between these two can prove quite large to
the extent that MNCs’ foreign affiliates finance their
operations by utilizing local credit markets. Lehmann,
Sayek, and Kang (2004:5) show that, in 1999, financing
provided through local debt markets accounted for
29.4% of the assets controlled by the majority-owned for-
eign affiliates of US MNCs.7
Foreign affiliates tap host-country credit markets to dif-
ferent degrees for a number of reasons, such as the
health of local credit markets, exchange rate risk, tax bill
minimization, and the availability of loan guarantees
(Lehmann et al. 2004; Desai, Foley, and Hines 2005; Beu-
gelsdijk et al. 2010. See also Caves 1996: ch. 6 and cita-
tions therein). MNCs’ financing choices often matter
3 US BEA, “Selected Data for Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates in All
Countries in Which Investment Was Reported, 2010.” Available at https://
www.bea.gov/international/xls/selected_mofas_cntry.xls (accessed March
2014).
4 The actual number is somewhere between $500,000 and $500,000.
5 US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’ Financial and Operating Data
of US MNCs abroad. Available at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm
(accessed March 2014).
6 These data are taken from the BEA’s Balance of Payments and Direct
Investment Position Data. Available at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_
MNC.cfm.
7 Harrison and McMillan (2003:85–86) find that firms in their sample of
399 foreign-owned firms in Cote d’Ivoire did the majority (87.16%) of their
long-term borrowing locally.
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little to political science theory in and of themselves.8 But
these financing choices often directly and indirectly
reflect aspects of the host country’s political environment.
This can create non-random measurement error—such
that using financially foreign FDI as a proxy for commer-
cially foreign FDI, or vice versa, likely induces bias in
many political science applications. This resulting mea-
surement error proves particularly problematic because it
is hard to know a priori which direction the resulting bias
should run in. For example, measures of financially for-
eign FDI might systematically understate the scale of com-
mercially foreign FDI in countries with “good”
institutions if those institutions also lead to stable finan-
cial sectors capable of providing MNCs with local financ-
ing (Beugelsdijk et al. 2010:1445). However, it might
produce the opposite effect if “good” institutions foster
exchange rate stability that reduces the risk of currency
mismatch (borrowing in dollars but earning in local cur-
rency; Beugelsdijk et al. 2010:1445) or if “bad” institu-
tions catalyze more local borrowing through more
generous loan guarantees (Li 2008).
What Does It Mean To Be Direct?
Direct investment requires a large enough ownership
stake in an enterprise to provide the investor with some
degree of corporate control. Corporate control matters
for at least two reasons. Control suggests a management
team responsible to the direct investors, and likely one
chosen and trained by them. The responsibility of local
management to the foreign direct investor makes it possi-
ble to think of FDI as a vehicle for the diffusion of corpo-
rate practices and norms from the MNC’s home country
to the host state. Control also implies a long-term com-
mitment. Exercising control of a foreign affiliate requires
time and expense. It often triggers mandatory disclosures.
It generally makes it difficult to disinvest quickly for prac-
tical reasons—selling large blocks of shares quickly is
likely to depress their price—and, often, legal reasons
related to insider trading. Controlling interests are not
acquired for speculative purposes. The foreign direct
investor’s long-term commitment to an investment pro-
ject is important to political science because it implies an
expectation of long-term exposure to host-state politics.
This allows us to treat FDI allocation as a reasonable
proxy for perceptions of political risk.
The IMF defines a 10% ownership threshold as the
point at which foreign portfolio investment (FPI) ends
and FDI begins. However, the 10% threshold reflects less
a substantive rule than a guideline, particularly as it per-
tains to control. In some cases, investors exercise control
with less than 10% share of equity. In other cases, they
require a larger ownership stake for corporate control.
The threshold for effective control is established varies
for a number of reasons—including, at a minimum, the
distribution of the other 90% of shareholder equity and
the relevant corporate-governance rules. In practice, the
data reported by some countries have at times deviated
from the 10% ownership threshold. For example, some
countries have used alternative thresholds, included firms
in which the foreign direct investor owns less than 10%
of equity but has an effective voice in management, or
excluded firms in which the foreign direct investor owns
more than 10% of equity but lacks an effective voice in
management (IMF [International Monetary Fund]/
OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development] 2003:24–26, see also Appendix tables 15–
18). According to the IMF’s 2001 Survey of Implementation
of Methodological Standards for Direct Investment, 10 of 28
surveyed OECD countries and 8 of 23 non-OECD coun-
tries used some criteria other than the 10% ownership
rule to identify foreign direct investors in their inward
stock data (IMF/OECD 2003:24–26).9
The 10% threshold is particularly problematic for test-
ing theories related to political risk. Henisz (2000) argues
that MNCs can mitigate political risk by entering projects
as the minority partner in a joint venture. Thus, the pres-
ence of joint ventures in which the foreign direct investor
is a minority partner may indicate the existence of political
risk mitigated by the mode of market entry.10 FDI mea-
sures that aggregate across minority- and majority-owned
affiliates therefore likely understate the relationship
between political forces and MNCs’ perceptions of politi-
cal risk. Better, in this case, to focus on the behaviors of
wholly—or at least majority-owned—affiliates. Their spa-
tiotemporal distribution provides a better candidate to
reliably reflect MNCs’ beliefs about the location of politi-
cal risk than measures based on a 10% threshold.
What Does It Mean To Be Investment
The overseas operations of MNCs involve a variety of
politically informed and politically consequential activi-
ties. MNCs raise capital from diverse foreign and domes-
tic sources and invest in various kinds of assets, hire
employees, sell products and services, and so on. All of
these activities are, in principle, quantifiable; all provide
meaningful indicators of the scale of MNC activities
abroad. Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) suggest that measuring
FDI by affiliate value added or affiliate sales provides a
more accurate indication of MNC presence than the
quantity of financial investment per se. Indeed, the nomi-
nal location of financial assets is often irrelevant to—and
may therefore provide a misleading proxy for—the loca-
tion of production, employment, and sales (Lipsey
2007:5). However, the mechanisms and process of inter-
est in many political science theories really involve pat-
terns of investment. To keep this section tractable, I
restrict my attention to definitions of investment that
implicate (at least some portion of) the value of capital
owned or controlled by the foreign affiliates of MNCs.
We find room for debate even within these relatively nar-
row parameters.11
In political science applications, how to account for
the liquid assets owned by MNCs’ foreign affiliates num-
bers among the key questions for determining what
should and should not count as investment. This matters
particularly for theories that relate FDI to political risk
through mechanisms based on the “obsolescing bargain.”
In the obsolescing bargain, the introduction of illiquid
capital by MNCs makes it costly for foreign investors to
8 For the purposes of most of our theories, we care about whether MNCs
own and operate local firms.
9 Similar figures apply to flow data.
10 This is more problematic if the researcher is asking whether certain
political institutions reduce political risk under the assumption that more FDI
implies less political risk. It is less problematic if political risk is directly
observed and the analyst is asking about its relationship to FDI.
11 Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) note the various ways in
which MNCs can control their supply chain without actually internalizing the
production of inputs, suggesting that FDI, however measured, is likely to
underestimate MNCs’ global influence or political clout.
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move operations to an alternative jurisdiction, allowing
domestic governments to alter the terms of investment in
their favor ex post without triggering capital flight (Ver-
non 1971; Kobrin 1987; Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller
1998). The more liquid the assets held by MNCs, the less
theories of political risk premised on the obsolescing bar-
gain apply.
The foreign affiliates of US MNCs carry a lot of liquid
assets on their balance sheet. According to 2004 data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Plant,
Property and Equipment (PPE)12 makes up 24% of the
assets held by the foreign affiliates of US MNCs while cur-
rent assets—cash and other highly liquid assets that are
expected to be converted into cash within a year under
normal operating conditions—make up 43% of the for-
eign affiliates of US MNCs’ assets (Kerner and Lawrence
2014:114).13 Whether or not the liquidity of large parts
of MNC affiliates’ balance sheets provokes a conceptual
mismatch to obsolescing bargain-based theories depends
on how we conceive of illiquidity. One view treats the rel-
evant aspect of liquidity as the ability to sell equity shares
quickly on the open market. Quickly selling a controlling
share of an enterprise is likely to depress the price. In
that sense, direct investment is less liquid than portfolio
investment no matter what assets the enterprise owns; the
simple fact of being a foreign direct investor triggers the
obsolescing bargain.
An alternative approach views illiquidity as a function
of the asset owned by investors. Adding a new factory or
another form of firm-specific fixed capital makes it
harder—and more expensive—to sell off or re-purpose
the foreign affiliate’s assets. According to this line of rea-
soning, investing in fixed capital invites host-country gov-
ernments to conclude that they can redraw the terms of
investment in their favor without inducing capital flight.
On the other hand, investors can more easily sell or repa-
triate liquid capital without incurring substantial losses.
Adding cash to an affiliate’s balance sheet neither trig-
gers nor exacerbates an obsolescing bargain between the
firm and the state.
When scholars address the location of risk in multina-
tional investment, they tend to find that the identity of
the underlying assets matters more than whether a for-
eign affiliate of an MNC controls those assets. Vernon
(1971), for example, argues that the fixed capital inten-
sive nature of multinational investment in the resource
extraction sector gives rise to the obsolescing bargain.14
Kobrin (1987), Frieden (1994), Caves (1996: 122), Berg-
ara et al. (1998), Henisz (2000), and Antras, Desai and
Foley (2009) make similar claims.15
If theory calls for a measure of illiquid assets, then
using an inclusive measure of assets owned or controlled
by a foreign direct investor can bias estimates. First, the
proportion of assets found in fixed capital often derives
from industry-specific factors. Extractive industry firms,
for example, typically carry more of their enterprise value
in the form of illiquid assets than do manufacturing and,
especially, service-sector firms (Kerner and Lawrence
2014:109). The measurement error induced by using total
assets as a proxy for illiquid assets therefore correlates
with the local industrial landscape, which itself constitutes
both a cause and consequence of politics (Ross 1999;
Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006). Similarly, a portion
—and sometimes a substantial portion—of liquid assets
on the balance sheets of an MNC’s foreign affiliate
reflects other considerations, such as tax avoidance and
local interest rates. Tax policy is, of course, the direct
product of politics, and interest rates are typically
informed by politics. Moreover, countries with safe banks
and stable policy environments make for, in general, bet-
ter tax havens than those lacking these attributes.
I do not mean to suggest the intrinsic superiority of
any one conceptualization of “foreign,” “direct,” or
“investment.” Rather, my discussion highlights how differ-
ent research questions demand different conceptualiza-
tions. The theories used by political science do not relate
to single thing called “FDI.” They often involve conceptu-
ally and empirically distinct phenomena that typically
accompany MNC’s overseas operations. The measures we
use to test those theories should reflect that diversity as
much as possible.
Stock and Flow Data
The vast majority of empirical work on FDI in political
science uses FDI flow and stock data made public by
UNCTAD, the IMF, or the OECD. This section discusses
what these data measure and how they relate to the phe-
nomena typically theorized about in the political science
literature.
FDI Flow Data
FDI flows represent the net value of financial transactions
between MNCs and their foreign affiliates over a period
of time, usually a year (see Mataloni 1995; OECD 2008).
Flow data aggregate across intercompany debt, equity,
and reinvested earnings. Equity transactions increase FDI
flows when the parent MNC acquires or increases its stake
in a foreign affiliate and decrease FDI flows when that
stake is sold or when the foreign affiliate takes an equity
stake in the parent. Intercompany debt transactions cap-
ture changes in the net debt position between parent
MNCs and their foreign affiliates. Reinvested earnings are
the parent MNC’s share of undistributed earnings that
are reinvested in the foreign affiliate. Reinvested earnings
add to FDI flow totals. Negative reinvested earnings rep-
resent parent MNCs’ share of operating losses (Banque
de France 1998: 1–2). FDI flow data are typically gathered
by central banks in order to monitor the balance of pay-
ments. They are often referred to as “balance of pay-
ments data.”
FDI flow data have two important features that limit
their usefulness in many political science questions. First,
they exclude locally financed capital. Second, they do not
discriminate between liquid or illiquid capital or on the
basis of whether capital is being used in the production
of goods and services. These coding rules are reasonable
if the purpose is to monitor the balance of payments or
12 PPE includes the value of physical structures, land, machinery, equip-
ment, and the book value of land, timber, mineral, and similar rights owned
by the foreign affiliate.
13 Included in that 43% is the 6% held in cash, the 24% held in receiv-
ables (that can generally be converted into cash through factoring) and 6%
held in marketable securities and pre-paid expenses.
14 Caves (1996: 161) notes a focus on the accumulation of fixed assets as
a measure of FDI in the empirical literature he reviews, though this focus is
not solely attributable to an interest in political risk.
15 The political risk associated with fixed capital can be addressed through
insurance (Jensen 2008) or securitization (Finnerty 2001), and the foreign
direct investor need not bear the full weight of it on their balance sheets.
Nonetheless, these markets are often incomplete (Li 2006: 245) and insurance
expensive. These financial products make political risk more manageable, but
it remains a costly problem.
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to gauge FDI’s relationship to exchange rates, capital
labor ratios, or related phenomena. How MNCs’ affiliates
use foreign capital and whether it is complemented on
their balance sheets by capital raised on local debt mar-
kets are often irrelevant to these questions. However, how
MNCs’ affiliates employ capital and whether they raise
funds on local debt markets do inform the scale of
MNCs’ commercial operations and the value of their
fixed capital assets. These quantities are conceptually clo-
ser to what most political science theories pertain to, and
FDI flows are often a poor proxy for them.
The 2004 Homeland Investment Act (HIA) provides a
particularly stark example of how FDI flow data can
become unmoored from the quantities that political sci-
entists typically theorize about. The HIA provided a tem-
porary tax break to US MNCs on qualifying repatriated
earnings. Its purpose was to incentivize MNCs to repatri-
ate and reinvest assets held abroad. The HIA was passed
on October 22, 2004 and provided tax relief in 2004 and
2005. Important clarifying documents governing eligibility
were not released by the US government until 2005 and
many firms used 2004 to build up assets abroad in order
to repatriate them later under the clarified tax rules (See
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011 and citations therein
for more details about the HIA).16
Figure 1 plots various indicators of US MNC activity
abroad around the time the HIA was enacted. These indi-
cators include outbound FDI flows, value added, expendi-
tures on fixed capital, employment, and the value of
plant property and equipment. The FDI flow data were
downloaded from UNCTAD’s database,17 and the other
measures were taken from the BEA’s data on the global
operations of (majority-owned) US MNCs (this data
source is described in more detail below). The FDI flow
data appear responsive to the HIA. The spike in out-
bound FDI flows in 2004 (outbound FDI flows more than
double from $129,352 million in 2003 to $294,905 mil-
lion in 2004) captures the buildup of foreign assets in
anticipation of the tax holiday; the steep drop in out-
bound FDI flows in 2005 (US FDI flows dropped to
$15,369 million, its lowest level since 1985) reflects the
subsequent wave of capital repatriation. Data that are
more clearly connected to MNCs’ commercial activities
abroad suggest a much different picture. There is little
indication that the HIA affected MNC operations when
those operations are measured by the number of employ-
ees, value added, the value of plant property and equip-
ment, or expenditures on fixed capital.
Whether the HIA mattered to US foreign investment
depends on why the question is being asked. If an analyst
is interested in FDI’s influence on exchange or interest
rates, or the extent and location of taxes paid by MNCs,
for example, the HIA and the consequent wave of capital
repatriation that is evident in the FDI flow data is poten-
tially important. These aren’t the questions that political
scientists tend to ask (though see Jensen 2013). More
mainstream political science questions include the follow-
ing: Did the HIA reduce FDI-transmitted US influence
abroad? or Did the HIA reduce US MNCs’ exposure to
political risk? These questions are better answered in ref-
erence to the scale of US MNCs commercial activities or
the value of fixed capital held in the host state. The
answer to these questions appears to be “no,” but FDI
flow data would, if used to answer them, suggest other-
wise.
The data in Figure 1 suggest that FDI flows are noisy
indicators of MNCs’ commercial activities aboard. They
are also biased indicators. Figure 2 shows the same data
series as figure one, but limits the sample to US MNC
activity in Belgium on the left-hand side and the Nether-
lands on the right.18 Several things are readily apparent
from Figure 2. US MNCs’ presence in Belgium and the
Netherlands was similar over this period when that pres-
ence is measured in terms of value added, employment,
or investments in fixed capital. These similarities are
obscured when flow data are used to proxy for them.
Prior to the HIA between 1997 and 2003, the Nether-
lands received annual FDI flows that were, on average,
over ten times as large as Belgium’s. Second, FDI flows
FIG 1. Measures of US outbound FDI 1997–2008
16 While the HIA worked as a catalyst for income repatriation, evidence
does not suggest this capital was reinvested into the US economy in the ways
the act’s supporters hoped (Dharmapala et al. 2011).
17 The figures are identical to the BEA’s data on financial outflows with-
out current-cost adjustment.
18 The variable scaling is changed slightly from Figure 1 to allow for more
readable graphs, but is consistent across the two panels in Figure 2.
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into Belgium and the Netherlands react very differently
to the HIA. The changing patterns in FDI flows before
and after the HIA was enacted are dramatically present in
the Dutch data and barely register in the Belgian data.
Neither country’s data show any obvious relationship
between commercial aspects of FDI and the HIA. This is
all to be expected given the Netherlands’ role as a tax
haven, but it underlines the difficulty in equating empiri-
cal measures of FDI flows with MNCs’ commercial activi-
ties.
This matters particularly to political science because
the Netherlands’ identity as a successful tax haven reflects
political decisions that the Dutch government has made
to create the requisite legal structure and politically
informed decisions that firms have made to trust that
legal structure (Van Dijk, Weyzig, and Murphy 2006;
Dharmapala and Hines 2009). While the Netherlands is
an extreme case (in 2007, the Netherlands accounted for
27.7% of all outbound US FDI flows),19 some countries
at some times—whether due to their tax policies, local
interest rates, exchange rate stability, the perceived reli-
ability of the domestic banking sector or domestic poli-
tics, or a combination of all these—are better places to
store liquid capital than others. The political roots of
these distinctions are a likely source of bias in many polit-
ical science applications using FDI flow data.
It is, of course, also the case that FDI flow data (and
stock data, described below) are measured imperfectly.
Notably, data on reinvested earnings are difficult to col-
lect because, unlike other components of FDI flows, they
do not cross a border and are thus not picked up
through international transactions reporting systems
(ITRS) that central banks use to monitor the balance of
payments. Collecting these data typically requires surveys,
which some countries, including some in the OECD,
either do not conduct or do not report (Lundan
2006:37–38; see also IMF/OECD 2003). This is a
potentially significant omission. In 2012, the $311 billion
in earnings that were reinvested by US controlled foreign
affiliates accounted for roughly 85% of the $367 billion
of US FDI outflows.20 The practical difficulties of measur-
ing FDI flows and the shortcomings of existing data in
doing so are discussed elsewhere in the literature in more
detail (IMF 1992; IMF/OECD 2000, 2003; Lipsey 2003,
2007; Ibarra and Koncz 2008; Beugelsdijk et al. 2010).
FDI Stock Data
FDI stock data represent the value of foreign direct inves-
tors’ stake in the foreign affiliates operating in a host
country at any given time. FDI stock data are typically cal-
culated in one of the three ways: at market value (or
approximations of market value), at historical cost, or by
cumulating FDI flows.
The OECD’s benchmark definition of FDI (OECD
2008) and the IMF’s balance of payments manual (sixth
edition) (IMF 2009) privilege market value estimates of
the FDI stock.21 FDI stock measured at market value dif-
fers from flow data in important ways beyond the obvious
distinction that flow data represent the value of FDI that
has occurred within a year and stock data represent the
value of FDI that has accumulated over time. Stock data
measured at market value should account for capital
gains and losses and other changes in the value of the
parent MNC’s equity position beyond those attributable
to the financial transactions captured by FDI flow data.
FDI stock data measured at market value answer the ques-
tion “What does it mean to be foreign?” differently than
FDI flow data do by putting the emphasis on the foreign
FIG 2. Measures of outbound US FDI in Belgium and the Netherlands 1997–2008
19 In years between 2008 and 2012, the Netherlands accounted for an
average of 16% of US outbound FDI, which is still well out of proportion to
the actual economic activity associated with those flows. Between 2009 and
2011, Employees of Dutch affiliates of US MNCs accounted for roughly 1.7%
of all employees of US MNCs active abroad (US BEA. Financial and Operating
Data of US MNCs abroad. http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm
(accessed April 2014).
20 BEA’ Balance of Payments and direct investment position data of US
MNCs abroad. Available at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm
(accessed April 2014).
21 While the market value of an MNC’s stake in local affiliates is straight-
forward if those affiliates’ shares are frequently traded on a stock exchange,
estimates often require measuring the market value of unlisted or illiquid
shares. These estimates are typically derived in part or in whole by establishing
an estimate of the current period book value of the enterprise and then esti-
mating market value based on the ratio of market to book value for firms that
are frequently traded on the domestic stock exchange. See IMF (2009: 122–
123) and OECD (2008:174–177). See also Damgaard and Elkjaer (2014), who
find that different valuation methods can lead to dramatically different esti-
mates of a country’s internal or external FDI stock.
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owner. These data often provide a better conceptual fit
to political science theory and are particularly well suited
to answering questions about FDI’s influence on politics.
However, market value estimates of the FDI stock can be
poorly suited to test theories about politics’ effects on
investor behavior. Changes in the market value of the
FDI stock in response to changes in political conditions
could reflect politics’ effects on MNCs’ investment deci-
sions, or they could reflect politics’ effects on asset values
through mechanisms that have little, if anything, to do
with the behavior of foreign direct investors.
An alternative to market value estimates of the FDI
stock are historical cost estimates that value the parent
MNCs’ position at the time it was acquired. Unlike mar-
ket value estimates, historical cost estimates do not factor
in capital gains or losses, except when realized through a
sale (Mataloni 1995:44). In the United States, the BEA
adjusts historical cost estimates to reflect exchange rate
induced changes in the value of the FDI stock (Mataloni
1995:44), though these adjustments are not universally
made (UNCTAD 2013a). Other countries calculate the
FDI stock by simply cumulating FDI flows or adding (or
subtracting) FDI flows from a stock estimate taken at a
point in time.
Historical costs estimates and estimates based on cumu-
lated FDI flows provide a less accurate picture of the
value of FDI stock than market value estimates. They can
be particularly misleading for long-standing investments
and when there has been significant inflation or unac-
counted for movements in the exchange rate in the time
since the investment was made (UNCTAD 2013a). How-
ever, their ignorance of capital gains and losses suggests
that changes in the FDI stock estimated at historical cost
or through cumulated FDI flows may, in some contexts,
provide a better indication of foreign direct investors’
behaviors than do changes in market value estimates. Nei-
ther the IMF nor the OECD recommends estimating FDI
stock using historical cost-based methods or by cumulat-
ing FDI flows. Misgivings about these methods notwith-
standing, the OECD (2008:178) recognizes that historical
cost estimates and accumulated FDI flows are often the
only options available to compilers.
Whether one method of estimating the FDI stock is
preferable to another in a political science application
depends on the theory that is being tested. Different
questions are often better answered with different data.
The more general point is that these methods of estimat-
ing the FDI stock are measuring different quantities and
can provide very different pictures of FDI trends. For
example, between 2007 and 2008, the market value of US
FDI stock abroad fell by 41% from $5.27 trillion to
$3.1 trillion, reflecting the global decline in financial
markets during the 2008 financial crisis. At the same
time, the historical cost value of the US FDI stock abroad
increased by 7.9% from $3 trillion in 2007 to $3.2 trillion
in 2008 (Lowe 2012:34; see also Landefeld and Lawson
1991:41).
Commonly used FDI stock data sets report FDI stock
data derived from a mix of different methods in different
countries at different times. The IMF’s FDI stock data
include estimates based on market values and estimates
based on book values (IMF/OECD 2003:135; Patterson,
Montanjees, Motala, and Cardillo 2004:10). Metadata
from the IMF are available through the Survey of Implemen-
tation of Methodological Standards for Direct Investment (SIMS-
DI) carried out jointly by the IMF and OECD in 1997,
2001, and 2003 (IMF 1992; IMF/OECD 2000, 2003; and
the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), which the
IMF has carried out since 2009.22 While some variation
across countries remains, these surveys suggest that the
IMF’s FDI stock data has moved steadily toward unifor-
mity across countries and toward international standards.
The OECD stock data conform to the same principles as
the IMF data, though reported values can depart signifi-
cantly due to differences in methodology, sources, the
timing of reporting, and the varying extent to which
countries report revisions to the two organizations (Patt-
erson et al. 2004:9–10). UNCTAD reports FDI stock fig-
ures that are a mix of estimates based on historical cost,
market value and, especially for developing countries,
cumulated FDI flows. Metadata pertaining to UNCTAD
FDI stock data are available in the World Investment
Report’s “Methodological Note” (UNCTAD 2013b).
In sum, FDI stock estimates are often better, if still
imperfect, conceptual fits to political science questions
than flow data. One drawback that stock data share with
flow data is that they do not differentiate between liquid
and illiquid assets, which is often an important distinction
to political science theory. A second drawback is that FDI
stock data sets often report estimates that are calculated
using different methods. The resulting figures are not
always directly comparable across countries or within
countries over time.23 Political science users of these data
should be aware of which method of conceptualizing the
FDI stock best represents the theorized about phenom-
ena and, to the extent possible, how well that accords
with what any particular data series is actually measuring.
The IMF’s and UNCTAD’s metadata can be especially
useful in this regard, though UNCTAD’s (2013a) warning
that “cross-country comparisons of FDI [stock] data must
be treated with caution” should be taken seriously.24
There are alternatives to the current use of flow and
stock data in political science. First, we could ask ques-
tions that relate to FDI as a financial phenomenon and
for which FDI flow data are more conceptually appropri-
ate. While this is a non-starter for the majority of main-
stream political science questions relating to FDI, such
questions do exist and could be pursued more often than
they have been. Second, we can complement our quanti-
tative analyses with case studies and/or surveys in order
to better illustrate causal mechanisms. This can be partic-
ularly useful when, as is often the case, direct measures
of (or unbiased proxies for) our theorized about quanti-
ties are not available on a large scale. Third, we could
make better use of data disseminated by countries that
collect comprehensive (and consistently defined and mea-
sured) data on MNCs’ commercial activities. For example,
MNCs in the United States are required to report the
financial details of their overseas operations to the BEA.
These data include balance sheet and financing informa-
tion, as well as payroll, production, and exporting data.
These surveys provide as comprehensive a view of MNC
22 Individual country metadata from the SIMSDI survey are available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/di/country.asp. Metadata for the CDIS
survey are available at http://cdis.imf.org/SearchMetadata.aspx.
23 See in particular UNCTAD (2013b) for documentation of changes
within countries over time in the method used to calculate FDI stock data.
24 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2001, 2007) data set on the external wealth
of nations provides a valuable alternative resource by reporting stocks across
different countries using a unified method. However, this method (stocks in
period t are equal to the real exchange rate adjusted value of stocks in period
t–1 + FDI flows in period t) is based on cumulated FDI flows and is therefore
conceptually no better of a match to political science theory than the FDI
flows themselves.
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activities as exists, though these data are naturally limited
to the overseas operations of US-based MNCs.25 The firm-
level data are kept confidential (and are therefore consid-
ered reliable), but several aggregates are publicly avail-
able.26 In the next section, I make use of those publicly
available aggregates to estimate the relationship between
MNC behaviors and democracy.
Table 1 summarizes the main FDI measure concepts
described above, as well as those used in the empirical
tests below.
Empirical Example: Does Democracy Attract FDI?
According to Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Science, the
two most cited works in political science with the words
“FDI” in the title are Jensen (2003) and Li and Resnick
(2003), both of which consider the relationship between
FDI, political risk, and democracy. Both theories concep-
tualize FDI as long-term investment subject to govern-
ment expropriation and both suggest that FDI will flow
to jurisdictions where property rights are protected. Both
papers operationalize FDI in terms of FDI flows. Where
they differ is in their model specification and empirical
results. Jensen finds that democracy attracts FDI while Li
and Resnick find that it repels FDI, once property rights
are accounted for as a control variable (see also Choi
2009; Li 2009).
Revisiting the empirical relationship between democ-
racy and FDI is not meant to resolve the theoretical
debate around democracy and FDI. Jensen, Biglaiser, Li,
Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats (2012:36–51) go a long
way toward doing so by finding that democracies expro-
priate less frequently and receive more favorable risk rat-
ings from insurers (see also Jensen 2008).27 Rather, the
purpose of this section is to show that the empirical rela-
tionship between FDI and democracy is highly sensitive
to how FDI is operationalized and, moreover, that models
using measures that my argument suggests should better
proxy for political risk sensitive investments generate
results that more closely reflect the insights from Jensen
et al. (2012).
Sample and Estimation
My sample includes every non-OECD country (plus Mex-
ico and Turkey)28 without US investment sanctions for
which data are available. This sample runs from 1997
through 2008 and includes between 654 and 730 observa-
tions from between 72 and 73 countries, depending on
the dependent variable being used. I follow Choi (2009)
and estimate my models using robust regression (the rreg
routine in Stata 12) as a means of dealing with outliers.
The model that I estimate is given below:
FDIjt ¼ aþ b1  polityjt1 þ b2  controlsjt1 þ Cþ ejt
ð1Þ
Where j subscripts the country, t subscripts the year, Γ
is a vector of year fixed effects, and polity is the polity2
variable taken from the Polity IV data set (Marshall, Jag-
gers, and Gurr 2011). My control variables are the log of
GDP, the log of GDP per capita, the log of trade as a per-
centage of GDP, GDP growth, the logged distance
between the country’s capital and Washington DC, and
capital account openness.29 I also control for “Law and
Order” from the ICRG data set. Doing so speaks to Li
and Resnick’s (2003) argument that the positive correla-
tion between democracy and FDI is a spurious echo of
the relationship between democracy and property rights
protection. I estimate this model in two ways. The first set
of estimates use the data in their time series cross-sec-
tional format. I also estimate my model on a cross-sec-
tional data set of panel averages of my dependent
variables (averaged over 1997–2006) and my independent
variables (averaged over the 15 years prior from 1982–
1996).
Democracy is not randomly assigned to country years
and plausibly influences FDI through a variety of chan-
nels other than political risk. The estimates provided by
these models should be understood as descriptive more
than causal. Nonetheless, a causal relationship between
democracy and MNC behavior through a political risk-
based channel is certainly plausible. Regardless, these
regressions describe and clarify an empirical relationship
that is both prominent and contested in the literature.
Dependent Variables
I use three different dependent variables in my tests, all
of which were taken from the BEA’s publicly available
data.
TABLE 1. Different Concepts for Measuring the Scale of MNC Investments





FDI flows Net value of equity, debt, and earnings flow between home
country parents and local affiliates
N N
FDI stock at market price Market value of foreign MNCs assets in the host country Y N
FDI stock at historical cost Value of foreign MNCs assets in the host country at the time




Book value of land and other physical assets, including all costs
incurred in making the assets usable
Y Y
25 The most comprehensive of these surveys is the benchmark surveys
taken every 5 years. Annual surveys are conducted on representative samples
and the data are extrapolated to generate estimates for the full universe.
26 More information on the survey as well as the publicly available data
can be found at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm. I focus my
attention on the publicly available aggregates, though the researchers may
apply for access to the underlying data.
27 Moreover, this application looks exclusively at United States originated
FDI while Jensen and Li and Resnick examine global flows. Differences
between these findings and the findings reported in those papers are in part
a function of that change.
28 This inclusion turns out be innocuous to the result I report.
29 GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and trade data are taken from
WDI. Distance is taken from the correlates of war data set. Capital account
openness is taken from Karcher and Steinberg (2012). Descriptive statistics for
all variables are included in the Table 3.
Andrew Kerner 811
My first measure is the BEA’s FDI flow measure.30
These are the same data that are reported by the OECD
in their dyadic FDI outflows data set. As described above,
these data capture the balance of annual capital flows
between US MNCs and their host-country affiliates. These
data discriminate based on the source of capital (funds
raised on local debt markets do not count toward FDI)
but do not discriminate on the basis of the form that cap-
ital takes (cash and fixed capital count equally).
The second measure that I use is annual changes in FDI
stock, measured at historical cost (market value-based stock
estimates from the BEA are not available at the country–year
level). Changes recorded in this variable are the result of
financial transactions between parent MNCs and their foreign
affiliates and exchange rate induced changes in the value of
previously acquired assets. Capital gains and losses (other than
those realized through sales) are not recorded in these data.
The third measure that I use is the annual expenditure
on PPE, which includes physical structures, land, machin-
ery, equipment, and land, timber, mineral and similar
rights owned by the foreign affiliate. This measure is
gross of depreciation so that it captures the rate at which
foreign affiliates of US MNCs are investing in their own
fixed capital stock, whether that investment constitutes an
expansion or simply the replacement of depreciated capi-
tal. These data differ from flow and stock data by being
limited to expenditures on fixed capital and by not dis-
criminating on the basis of local versus foreign financing.
A further difference between these data on flow and
stock data is that data on capital expenditures refer to
majority-owned affiliates, while stock and flow data refer
to the full universe of overseas affiliates in which the par-
ent MNC owns a greater than 10% share.31 To the extent
that the relationship between democracy and FDI is dri-
ven by political risk, expenditures on fixed capital by
majority-owned affiliates should be the most capable of
drawing that relationship out.32 Descriptive statistics for
all variables used in this analyses are noted in Table 3.
Results
The results of my estimates are shown in Table 2. Models
1, 2, and 3 analyze the data in its time series cross-sec-
tional format using FDI flows, changes in FDI stock and
expenditures on fixed capital, respectively, as dependent
variables. The itx subscript on the independent vari-
ables in these models indicates a 1-year lag. The results of
these models are anticipated by the discussion above. I
find a positive and statistically insignificant relationship
between democracy and FDI flows, a negative and statisti-
cally insignificant relationship between democracy and
annual changes in FDI stock, and a positive and highly
statistically significant relationship between democracy
and annual expenditures on fixed capital. This is to be
expected if democracy reduces political risk and if the
fixed capital expenditures of majority-owned firms are a
more appropriate indicator of firms’ perceptions of politi-
cal risk. The substantive effect is such that a one-stan-
dard-deviation (5.9 unit) increase in democracy is
estimated to yield an $11.2 million increase in capital
expenditures. By comparison, the median value of fixed
capital expenditure in this sample is $47 million.33
Models 4, 5, and 6 replicate models 1, 2, and 3, but
employ a cross-sectional analysis on panel averages of the
data. The itx subscript on the independent variables in
these models indicate that the panel averages for the
independent variables are taken over 1982–1996, while
the panel average for the dependent variables are taken
over 1997–2006. These estimates are substantively similar
to those from models 1, 2, and 3. While the coefficients
on my polity score measure of democracy are always posi-
tive, I fail to find statistically significant evidence that
either FDI flows or changes in FDI stock are affected by
democracy. I do find such evidence with respect to fixed
capital expenditures. The coefficient is positive and statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level.34 The substantive
effects are somewhat larger but still similar to those
reported in model 3. A one-standard-deviation increase in
the panel averaged democracy variable (5.9 units) yields
a $22.3 million increase in average annual fixed capital
TABLE 2. Effect of Democracy on Different Measures of FDI














Polityitx 0.3 (0.4) 0.5 (0.6) 1.9 (0.5)*** 0.5 (2.7) 2.8 (2.5) 3.8 (1.3)**
lnGDPitx 17.1 (1.9)*** 16.1 (2.9)*** 35.1 (2.5)*** 37.1 (11.4)** 60.8 (10.7)*** 36.1 (5.5)***
lnGDPPCitx 0.9 (2.7) 2.0 (4.0) 1.5 (3.6) 35.5 (16.7)* 9.1 (15.7) 7.2 (8.1)
lntrade/GDPitx 1.2 (5.8) 16.5 (8.4)* 5.6 (7.4) 22.7 (34.1) 20.8 (32.0) 31.5 (16.4)
lndist 21.5 (5.5)*** 3.2 (8.0) 29.7 (6.9)*** 20.5 (30.1) 0.0 (28.3) 25.6 (14.5)
GDP growthitx 23.8 (20.3) 24.8 (30.1) 24.9 (25.8) 21.6 (229.8) 17.2 (214.6) 86.6 (111.4)
Law and orderitx 0.6 (2.4) 4.1 (3.7) 13.6 (3.1)*** 13.8 (16.3) 15.7 (15.4) 0.6 (7.9)
Capital account
opennessitx
0.3 (1.9) 3.7 (2.8) 4.4 (2.4) 23.4 (14.8) 0.1 (14.0) 8.7 (7.3)
Constant 164.4 (63.1)** 369.1 (92.3)*** 467.7 (78.9)*** 718.8 (367.8) 1417.3 (344.9)*** 630.1 (175.2)***
r2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
N 730 700 654 73 72 73
(Notes. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, lagged independent variables bearing the itx subscript are lagged 1 year in model 1–3 and represent the 1982–1996
averages in models 4–6 year fixed effects included in all models but not shown all models estimated using the rreg routine in Stata.)
30 I use “Financial flows without current-cost adjustment” data. These data
and all other dependent variables used in this analysis are restated in constant
2000 dollars.
31 In practice, roughly 86% of the total asset value recorded by the BEA
in my sample is found in majority-owned affiliates, which is consistent with
findings in Barefoot and Mataloni (2011).
32 While direct comparisons would be preferable, neither capital expendi-
tures data from the full universe of foreign affiliates of US MNCs, nor stock
and flow data from majority-owned affiliates are available.
33 Fixed capital expenditures are not normally distributed, so standard
deviations of it do not make appropriate benchmarks.
34 These findings are somewhat sensitive to the period of time over which
the independent variables are averaged. However, the substantive implications
are unchanged when these variables are averaged over other plausible inter-
vals.
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expenditure, compared to the sample median of $57 mil-
lion.
Summary
If the relationship between democracy and FDI is driven
by political risk, we should expect it to be more evident
in measure of fixed capital expenditures by majority-
owned affiliates than in the flow and stock data that are
more commonly used to test this proposition. These data
have three qualities that make it well suited for this pur-
pose: (i) They do not discriminate between local and for-
eign financed assets; (ii) they focus on the deployment of
capital in illiquid forms and are therefore consistent with
the theories underpinning the political risk literature;
and (iii) they focus attention of the behavior of majority-
owned foreign affiliates that are least likely to be other-
wise insulated from political risk through joint venture
partners.
The results of my empirical tests are consistent with this
idea. Democracy’s correlation with FDI flows and changes
in the FDI stock is smaller and less statistically significant
than its correlation with fixed capital expenditures by
majority-owned affiliates. More generally, the sorts of con-
clusions that we might draw about the relationship
between MNCs and politics are highly sensitive to the way
MNCs’ activities are conceptualized and measured.
Political Scientists (Usually) Don’t Care About FDI
Few have been more attentive to measurement issues sur-
rounding FDI over the past 20 years than the economist
Robert Lipsey. In the abstract to a 2007 article, Lipsey
argues that “most uses of FDI data require measures of
employment, payrolls, capital inputs, and output from
FDI” (Lipsey 2007:1). Lipsey writes about the problematic
usage of FDI flow and stock data to answer questions
commonly asked by economists, but these data don’t
measure anything of particular relevance to most political
scientists either. We generally deploy them as a proxy var-
iable for other aspects of multinational investment. They
often poorly serve that purpose. I hope that this article
demonstrates that point. My analysis of MNC activity’s
empirical relationship to democracy shows that getting
the measure right or wrong has significant implications
for the sort of conclusions that we draw concerning the
nature of FDI and the role of political forces in global
finance.
It follows that those political scientists who write about
FDI should change the way we describe our shared
research agenda. Despite the problems associated with
using FDI flow data to test most FDI-related theories in
political science, these measures imply a reasonable defi-
nition of FDI. Fixed capital investments made by major-
ity-owned affiliates, while better suited to testing
important FDI-related political science theories, do not.
Indeed, in many contexts, we may not actually care about
FDI at all. Most of our theories involve mechanisms and
processes related to the scale of MNCs’ activity. FDI
amounts to an arbitrary—and often misleading—subset
of those activities. We should characterize this literature
as the study of MNCs. The term encompasses the variety of
activities that motivate our theories; it leaves open the
question of what measures best allow us to test them.
Whereas as Lipsey (2007) wrote that “most uses of FDI
data require measures of employment, payrolls, capital
inputs, and output from FDI,” I suggest that most of
what we claim requires FDI data does not. Instead, we
are asking questions about employment, payrolls, capital
inputs, and output from FDI. We should measure these
instead.
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